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I. Research topic 
The rise of China, and the intensifying Sino-American rivalry is one of 
the most exciting issues in global politics. Different aspects of the issue 
raise different questions: If the total GDP of China really surpasses that 
of the USA, then exactly what kind of role will Beijing have in the 
global international system?  On the regional level, how will the Sino-
American and Sino-Japanese competition for influence in Southeast 
Asia come out? The significance of the issue is well demonstrated by the 
fact that after the leadership transition in China and presidential 
elections in the USA both in 2012, the first trip of president Obama lead 
to Southeast Asia.  
In his 2012 book, “The China Choice” Hugh White concludes, that it 
would be neither in the interests of China, nor the USA to show 
confrontative attitude towards each other. Instead, he suggests the USA 
to embrace China in a system similar to the concert of great powers that 
existed in Europe during the decades after 1815.  (White [2012]) 
In his paper “The Rise of China and the Future” published in Foreign 
Affairs in 2008, G. John Ikenberry states, that it is more advantageous 
for China to integrate into the US lead global system, than to try to build 
its’ own.(Ikenberry [2008] pp. 23-37.)  
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In his 2012 paper in Foreign Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski concludes, 
that only a “Broader West”, including Russia and Turkey, can be able to 
properly balance China. (Brzezinski [2012] pp. 97-104.) 
In his 2011 book, „A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the 
Struggle for Mastery in Asia” Aaron Friedberg concludes, that it is 
neither in the interest of the USA, nor in the interest of China to let their 
rivalry to escalate into an antagonistic standoff, and that it is also 
possible to avoid that. (Friedberg [2011]) 
In his 2010 paper, Barry Buzan concludes that a peaceful rise will be 
possible, but difficult for China. In his view, China has two choices: If it 
focuses on regional dominance, then it can emphasize its’ difference 
from the West in terms of culture as well as social and political views. If 
China takes increasing its’ global influence as the main goal, then it will 
have to face an increasing pressure for reforms. (Buzan [2010]) 
In his 2011 book “On China”, Henry Kissinger states that China and the 
USA are linked to each other by such a deep interdependence, that a 
cold war between them would seriously endanger the economic 
development not only both of them, but that of the entire Asia-Pacific 
region as well. According to his conclusion, an American strategy trying 
to prevent the rise of China would be inappropriate, since China is not 
trying to change the internal system of other countries, holds a key 
position in the global economy, and follows a relatively restrained 
foreign policy. (Kissinger [2011]) 
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In his paper “The Geography of Chinese Power”, Robert D. Kaplan 
identifies the three natural directions of China’s expansion as Central 
Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Russian Far East. At the same time, he 
identifies Russia and India as the two main natural barriers for China’s 
expansion. (Kaplan [2010]) 
My thesis, as well as my main hypothesis differs from most of these 
works, and is on a common platform with Robert D. Kaplan’s work in 
the sense that instead of focusing on the policies of the USA and China, 
it focuses on the geopolitical factors that are beyond the control of the 
players, but that are defining their choices. In my thesis, I am attempting 
to analyze, how these external factors form their policies. 
II. Methodology and hypothesis  
 
The primary focus of the thesis is not on the political doctrines and goals 
of China and the USA themselves, but on those external geopolitical 
factors, that determine their choices and policies.   
As an analysis focusing on external factors that limit the options of the 
players, my thesis represent a geopolitical-realist approach. To describe 
this approach, we can take a work of Robert D. Kaplan. In his paper “The 
Revenge of Geography”, published in 2009 in Foreign Policy, Kaplan 
describes the validity of geopolitics as a key element of the re-emerge of 
realism. Kaplan describes this kind of realism in contrast not only with 
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the liberal, but in contrast with the neoconservative view as well. He 
concludes that the liberal and neoconservative approaches are two 
manifestations of the same idealistic view, since both can be rooted back 
to the universalistic idea of promoting western democracy. In contrast, 
this kind of realism is analyzing external factors beyond the control of the 
players, such as geography, cultural identity, or historical legacy, and 
trying to define how these factors affect the players. He points out that 
geography is a key factor among these. Before the emerge of political 
science as a discipline on its’ own, in the political thinking of 18th-19th 
century Europe, geography as a discipline has played a key role and often 
included the analysis of political, cultural and geo-strategic factors. 
(Kaplan [2009]) 
The main conclusion of my thesis is that in their competition for more 
influence, geographic location is a comparative advantage for the USA, 
and a comparative handicap for China. On the one hand, the location of 
the USA has most of the strategic advantages of an island nation, with 
both of its’ land neighbors, Canada and Mexico being inside its’ zone of 
influence. Therefore, it’s hegemony over the North American continent at 
this moment seems to be unchallenged, and the continent itself is 
strategically shielded by the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic Oceans. On the 
other hand, in contrary to the USA, China has at least three direct 
neighbors that have great power identities on their own: India, Russia and 
Japan. Since direct neighborhood usually does lead to some kind of 
conflict of interests, this geographic setting seems to give the opportunity 
of “divide and rule” to the USA, playing out the powers of Asia against 
8 
 
each other, in somewhat the same manner, as Britain has continuously 
played out the powers of mainland Europe against each other during the 
18
th
-19
th
 centuries, in its’ mainland power balancing policies. On the other 
hand, China is not able to play out the same card against the USA, 
because on the North American continent, there is no significant country 
defying the USA. Since the USA is able to play out this card against 
China in Asia, but China is not able to play out this card against the USA 
in North America, this gives the USA a comparative advantage versus 
China. This comparative advantage of the USA seems to be the most clear 
in case of India and Japan, since they are the second and third most 
significant economies in Asia after China, but they both have unresolved 
disputed issues with China, that the USA can play out. 
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III. Results  
Traps in Sino-Indian relations  
China and India have been rivals since as early, as the 1960s, due to 
border disputes and a general, mutual geostrategic mistrust. What further 
complicates the issue is that, as a consequence of this rivalry, China has 
been allied with Pakistan ever since then. The alliance between China and 
Pakistan involves China in the bitter feud between India and Pakistan, 
therefore posing a serious obstacle for any meaningful compromise 
between China and India, even if they were able to solve their other 
disputes. On the other hand, China and India are somewhat trapped in this 
trilateral issue. For India, a compromise with China would have no 
meaning without China ceasing its’ cooperation with Pakistan.  For 
China, on the other hand, dumping Pakistan would be a suicidal move if 
there is no solid guarantee for a real change in India’s doctrine. And so 
far, we can see no such guarantee. So, dumping Pakistan to get the 
benevolence of India would be an extremely risky, on the short run, self-
harming step for China, it is therefore unlikely. On the other hand, as long 
as China and Pakistan continue to cooperate, a meaningful compromise 
between China and India, and a fundamental change in the doctrine of 
India seems to be extremely unlikely. The trapping combination of 
circumstances therefore seems to deem China and India to security 
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rivalry, as well as to deem India for aligning itself with the USA, and 
Pakistan aligning itself with China.  
The Beijing-New-Delhi-Islamabad triangle 
During the 1950s, Pakistan was a key ally of the USA, while the PRC 
cooperated with the USSR, (Ross [1993]) and India positioned itself as a 
key member of the non-aligned movement, trying to build good relations 
with the PRC as well. From the mid-1950s however, tensions started to 
increase between China and India, and armed border incidents became 
more and more frequent. (Malik [2012] pp. 347-349.) These 
developments culminated in the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, and 
Sino-Indian relations have been marked by rivalry ever since then. 
Cooperation between China and Pakistan started back in that time. The 
deterioration of Sino-Indian relations was an excellent opportunity for 
Pakistan to get the support of China, along the “enemy of my enemy” 
logic. By this time, the Sino-Soviet split has already occurred, so 
alignment with China did not harm the traditional alliance between 
Pakistan and the USA. During the normalization of Sino-American 
relations in the 1970s, it was even a benefit for the USA, that its’ 
Pakistani ally already maintained friendly relations with China for a 
decade by then. (Siddiqi and Yang [2011] ) In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
China-Pakistan duo was supported by the USA, while India received 
support from the Soviet Union.(Malik [2012] p. 348.)  
This equilibrium however, ended by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and 
the emergence of rivalry between the USA and the PRC. By now, rivalry 
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with China brought the USA and India to a common platform. (George 
and Venkatshamy [2012] pp. 195-197.)  The cooperation between China 
and Pakistan continued, but as of now, the changed environment causes 
incredible difficulties in the cooperation between the USA and Pakistan. 
During the Cold War, Pakistan was the key ally of the USA in South 
Asia, and their cooperation continued well into the 2000s as well. By now 
however, it gradually seems to have become more important for the USA 
to reach cooperation with India against China, than its’ alliance with 
Pakistan. It does not seem to worth for the USA to jeopardize the 
cooperation with India for the alliance with Pakistan. (Staniland [2011] 
pp. 133-148.) Pakistan on the other hand, continues to define itself against 
India, so it increasingly views the US cooperation with India as 
abandonment, if not betrayal. (Pant [2012]) This, of course helps China in 
becoming the number one ally of Pakistan, since a strong Pakistan is in 
the interest of China to balance India. Cooperation between the two 
countries increased in the past two decades. China sold heavy water and 
plutonium to Pakistan, and provided technological assistance to the 
Pakistani nuclear program. Pakistan on the other hand provided access to 
the strategic port of Gwadar for China. China has also sold airplanes, 
submarines, and short range missiles to Pakistan, and provided 
technological assistance to the development of communication satellites 
and ballistic missiles. (Pant [2012])   
What we can see in the region, is that the rivalry between China and 
India, and the cooperation between China and Pakistan is continuing. This 
however, limits the choices of both India and Pakistan, pushing India to 
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align itself with the USA, and Pakistan to align itself with China. (George 
and Venkatshamy [2012] pp. 194-203.)   We can see a system of 
multilevel power balance policies here, with the USA balancing China by 
supporting India, and China balancing India by supporting Pakistan.  
Traps in Sino-Japanese relations  
Among other issues, the double question of Japan’s alignment with the 
USA and the remilitarization of Japan seem to form an especially difficult 
trap for Beijing and Tokyo. At the present Japan is strongly allied with 
the USA on security issues. Therefore, a Sino-Japanese cooperation 
regarding the USA-PRC rivalry seems to be impossible, as long as this 
alliance between Japan and the USA exists. Japan, however, cannot give 
up its’ alliance with the USA as long as it does not have sufficient 
security capacities on its’ own. Achieving sufficient security capacities 
however, would require Japan to revise its’ ‘peace constitution’, and go 
through a process of significant remilitarization. A remilitarization of 
Japan however, seems to be unacceptable for China at this moment. 
Without remilitarization though, Japan will not be able to give up its’ 
alliance with the USA. So, the issue of the armed forces of Japan seems to 
be a key obstacle to a meaningful Sino-Japanese compromise. A Japanese 
armed force with a size and capacities acceptable for China would likely 
to be insufficient for Japan. An armed force with a size and capacity 
sufficient for Japan would likely to be unacceptable for China. Japan is 
unlikely to give up its’ alliance with the USA without remilitarization as a 
precondition. China however, is unlikely to tolerate a Japanese 
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remilitarization without Japan giving up its’ alliance with the USA as a 
precondition. This trap seems to block a meaningful Sino-Japanese 
security compromise, therefore deeming the two countries to rivalry, and 
dooming Japan maintain its’ cooperation with the USA. 
US policies and the Sino-Indian and Sino-
Japanese tensions  
As we can see, there are several factors, beyond the control of the 
players that make a meaningful Sino-Japanese or Sino-Indian 
compromise extremely difficult to reach. As a consequence, these 
factors make it easy for the USA to play out India and Japan against 
China. The manifestation of this combination of factors seems to be 
the quadrilateral cooperation between the USA, India, Japan, and the 
regional ‘Anglo-Saxon’ state, Australia. The quadrilateral 
cooperation between these four countries started in 2008.  
Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe played a key role during his 
first term in the formation of the initiative, when he called for a 
quadrilateral summit between the leaders of the USA, India, Japan 
and Australia. Originally, Abe argued that a “broader Asia” should 
be taken into focus, and within this broader Asia, the four most 
significant countries that share the principles of multiparty 
democracy and human rights should intensify cooperation, and 
encourage China to accept similar principles well. Representatives of 
the four countries held their first informal quadrilateral talk in May 
2007. This has already triggered diplomatic protests from China. 
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(Terada [2011] p.8.) Due to protest by China, cooperation did not 
formalize on a quadrilateral level since then, but the four countries 
established a network of bilateral agreements, linking any two of 
them to each other. Besides security pacts that have already existed 
between the USA and Japan and between the USA and Australia for 
decades, new ones were formed between each two of the four. India 
and Japan signed their security pact in 2008, (Paul [2012]) while 
Australia and India signed theirs in 2009. Australia even agreed to 
sell uranium to India. (Panda [2012]) The USA and India signed 
their framework agreement defining their security cooperation 
already in 2005. As a result, we can see the network of a USA-Japan, 
a USA-Australia, a USA-India, an India- Japan, an India-Australia, 
and a Japan-Australia security agreement being formed.  
The cooperation thus includes two out of those three neighbors of 
China that have a great power identity on their own (India and Japan 
out of Russia, India and Japan) as well as the USA. This cooperation, 
if it continues in the long term, means such a broad informal 
coalition, that poses a significant obstacle for China in its’ 
competition with the USA, even if it manage to become the single 
strongest power on Earth. 
The role of Russia 
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To summarize the analysis that is included in my thesis on the role of  
Russia, is that despite its’ cooperation with China during the height 
of the SCO period in 2001-2008, it can rather be viewed as a third 
party balancing between China and the USA, than a committed ally 
of China. Despite the recent past marked by SCO, we can already see 
certain factors that question the long term future of Sino-Russian 
cooperation. It seems to be likely, that the Sino-Russian dispute 
regarding the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 was not just a seasonal 
anomaly, but symptom of deeper structural problems. The attempt 
and failure of Russo-American special partnership in the early 1990s 
and the attempt and loss of momentum of the SCO cooperation form 
the outlines of a definite Russian great power behavior: 
- Russia has a great power identity, and depending on the 
actual circumstances, is ready to face disputes with each of 
the USA and China, and political ideology is not a major 
influencing factor in this. (Hostile Sino-Soviet relations 
around 1970, and hostile Russo-American relations in the 
late 1990s) 
- Depending on the actual circumstances, Russia is also ready 
to cooperate with each of China and the USA. Usually 
cooperates with the one seen as the lesser potential rival 
against the one seen as the major potential rival at the given 
moment. 
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- Since Russia’s foreign policy is defined by its’ own great 
power identity, it won’t participate in any alliance where it 
could only have the role of the junior partner. 
- Due to the relative decline of the fundamentals of its’ great 
power position in the last two decades however, today 
Russia could only be a junior partner on the side of either 
the USA or China.  
Along this logic, it is not profitable for Russia to commit itself on the 
side of neither China, nor the USA, because it could only be a junior 
partner on the side of each one. Sino-Russian cooperation in the 
frames of the SCO fits the decades old trend of Russian foreign 
policy, but only as long as the USA is a more significant potential 
rival to Russia, than China is. Present tendencies however are likely 
to make exactly this judgment less and less clear in Moscow in the 
coming decades. The further strengthening of China and the further 
relative decline of the global hegemony of the USA can even bring a 
moment, when Russia will see a lesser potential rival in the USA 
than in China. Thus for Moscow, exactly the continuation of the 
trend of the past decades, the very same logic that defined its’ 
policies in the past, suggests the choice to commit itself neither on 
the side of China, nor on the side of the USA, but cooperating with 
one or the other from case to case, always depending on the actual 
circumstances of the moment. As we could see, the symptoms of 
structural problems within the SCO are already apparent, with China 
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trying to ease the dependence of the Central Asian countries on 
Russia, while Russia is struggling to maintain it.(Wilhelmsen and 
Flikke [2011]) 
For Russia, besides traditional security, the character of its’ economy 
also makes balancing the rational choice. The main driving force of 
Russia’s economy is today energy export, and the two main export 
markets of these goods are the EU and China.(Markestos [2009]) If, 
in the future Russia roughly equally shares its’ energy exports 
between the EU and China, this can result a competition between the 
EU and China for these goods, what can increase the space for 
maneuver for Russia. 
At the same time, this logic in Russia’s foreign policy makes it an 
interest for both China and the USA to make efforts to avoid disputes 
with Moscow. In 2001-2008 it was in a large part the confrontative 
doctrine of the Bush administration that pushed Russia into the SCO, 
while the Russo-American cooperation of the early 1990s was 
preceded by decades of hostile Sino-Soviet relations. Thus hostile 
relations between the USA and Russia can push Russia to cooperate 
with China, while hostile relations between China and Russia can 
make it to cooperate with the USA. We can already see sings of 
awareness about this factor not only in the Chinese, but also in the 
American foreign policy. While (especially since 2010) the Obama 
administration has increased its’ engagement in the Asia-Pacific, is 
strengthening its’ cooperation with its’ old allies (such as Japan, 
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Australia and the Philippines), is trying to build cooperation with its’ 
new allies (such as India and Vietnam), is making efforts to form 
coalitions from these to contain China, we can see right the contrary 
regarding Russia in Europe. American policies considerably changed 
since the color revolutions of the early 2000s. The USA took the 
option of Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership off the 
agenda, and Russia reinforced its’ influence in those countries since 
then. This shows some willingness of the USA to improve relations 
with Russia, and to avoid forcing it into an alliance with China. We 
can’t tell whether this is a conscious attempt to loosen the ties 
between Russia and China, or it is just the spontaneous consequence 
of the USA concentrating its’ limited resources to the Asia-Pacific. 
But the result is the same in both cases.  
Economic interdependence  
In the thesis, the effects of global economic interdependence were 
analyzed in a separate chapter as well. The conclusion of this chapter 
is that the rivalry of the USA and the PRC is in character much 
closer to the power games of 18
th
 century Europe, restrained by 
dynastic solidarity, than to the antagonistic standoff of the Cold War 
and other 20
th
 century conflicts. 
Conclusion 
My thesis concludes that the geographic factor has a defining impact 
on the possibilities of China and the USA-PRC great power rivalry. 
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While the USA has all advantages of an island nation with both 
Canada and Mexico being inside its’ zone of influence, China is a 
classic continental power, with at least three such neighbors that 
have great power identities on their own: India, Russia and Japan. 
This setting includes factors that make cooperation extremely 
difficult between China and India, as well as between China and 
Japan. At the same time these factors make it easy for the USA to 
align itself with India and Japan. At the same time, in case of Russia, 
keeping distance towards both the USA and China seems to be more 
likely than alignment on the side of China. Altogether these factors 
are a handicap for China and an advantage for the USA.  At the same 
time, this setting, as well as the policies of the USA closely resemble 
the continental power balance policies of 18
th
-19
th
 century Britain 
towards mainland Europe.  
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